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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Fisher's Motion to Strike Davidhizar's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
Davidhizar contends that the trial court acted appropriately when it denied 
Fisher's Motion to Strike Davidhizar's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud 
because: 1) he was not dilatory in filing his memorandum in opposition to Fisher's 
summary judgment motion; and 2) the trial court changed his mind and reversed his 
decision denying his motion to extend the time to file a memorandum in opposition to 
Fisher's motion for summary judgment, or the trial correctly exercised discretion and 
accepted his late-filed memorandum. 
A. The Trial Court's Denial of Fisher's Motion to Strike Was an Abuse of 
Discretion. 
Under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has the 
discretion to grant a motion to enlarge time after the time for doing the act has expired, 
"where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). 
When by these rules an act is required or allowed to be done at or 
within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if 
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made 
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where 
the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend 
the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 
and 60(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
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Mr. Wuthrich filed an affidavit in support of his Motion for Withdrawal of 
Counsel and Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Fisher's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 556-557). The trial court after considering Mr. Wuthrich's affidavit 
determined that Mr. Wuthrich did not justify his failure to timely file the memorandum 
and denied the motion to extend the time to file a memorandum opposing Fisher's motion 
for summary judgment. 
On appeal, Davidhizar argues that the trial court in denying the motion to strike, 
either changed his mind and reversed his decision denying the motion to extend time, or 
exercised his discretion to accept a late-filed brief. Unfortunately, the trial court did not 
state the grounds on which he denied the motion to strike. However, whether the trial 
court changed his mind and reversed his denial of the motion to extend time, or exercised 
his discretion to accept the untimely memorandum, such action was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The trial court's order denying or granting a motion will be upheld absent an abuse 
of discretion. {Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah,2001) at f 22). A trial court abuses 
its discretion only when its "decision was against the logic of the circumstances and so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice... [or] resulted from bias, 
prejudice, or malice." {Jones v. Layton/Okland, 214 P.3d 859 (Utah,2009) at % 25) 
Under Rule 6(b)(2), the trial court could only grant Davidhizar's motion to extend 
time if his attorney had established excusable neglect for failing to timely file the 
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memorandum. "'[E]xcusable neglect... is an admittedly neglectful delay that is 
nevertheless excused by special circumstances.'" {Reisbeckv. HCA Health Servs., 1 P.3d 
447(2000,UT)at1|l3). 
In this case, Davidhizar's attorney, Mr. Wuthrich, offered four justifications for 
failing to meet the deadline for filing a memorandum. First, he believed that counsel had 
agreed that "everything was on hold" pending attempts at settlement. Second, discovery 
had not been completed. Third, he had sent his notice of withdrawal prior to receiving the 
motion for summary judgment. Fourth, there was an irreconcilable conflict between two 
of his clients preventing him from representing them. (R. at 556, ff 2,3; R. at 557, f4,7, 
8). 
The record is utterly devoid of any diligence by Mr. Wuthrich, Davidhizar or Mr. 
Belnap that would justify their neglect in failing to oppose Fisher's summary judgment 
motion. First, Mr. Wuthrich's claim that he believed that counsel had agreed that 
"everything was on hold" pending settlement discussions, provides no basis upon which 
to excuse Mr. Wuthrich's delay after he was served with Fisher's motion for summary 
judgment. (See Jones, 214 P.3d 859 (Utah,2009) at lf29). Upon receiving the motion, Mr. 
Wuthrich was fully aware that Fisher was proceeding with the case, yet he did not timely 
respond to the motion. (Id.) Fisher also denies that there was ever such an understanding 
between counsel. (R. at 579, ^ fl6) 
Second, Mr. Wuthrich's request for additional time based on the need for more 
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discovery in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment is a Rule 56(f) motion. 
Rule 56(f) allows the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file an affidavit 
stating reasons why the party is presently unable to submit evidentiary affidavits in 
opposition to the moving party's supporting affidavits.l 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing a motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.(Rule 56(f), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.) 
A Rule 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that might defeat the 
pending summary judgment motion.(Energy Management Services, LLC. v. Shaw ,110 
P.3d 158,160 (Utah App.,2005) % 11) However, Mr. Wuthrich's motion and affidavit 
failed to specify any issue that would have defeated the motions for summary judgment. 
(R. at 556-557) 
The affidavit also failed to demonstrate how discovery would be of any assistance 
in Davidhizar's response to the motions for summary judgment. Mr. Wuthrich's assertion 
that Davidhizar had not completed discovery and that completing discovery was crucial 
for Davidhizar to respond to the motions for summary judgment does not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 56(f). 
"Simply asserting that more discovery is needed and that a proper response to the 
motion for summary judgment is impossible due to the other party's failure to 
xCrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241,1243 (Utah 1994) 
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cooperate with discovery requests is inadequate to overcome summary judgment. 
Parties must 'offer more than conclusory assertions to demonstrate the existence of 
a genuine issue for trial/ and cannot justify further discovery without providing a 
viable theory as to the nature of the facts they wish to obtain. Id.; see also Jensen v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10thCir.l993)." (Grynbergv. 
Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, (Utah,2003) \ 57). 
Mr. Wuthrich's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory. 
"[A] party's rule 56(f) motion for a continuance is not dilatory if the party 
has already initiated discovery proceedings, diligently seeks access to 
information that is within the sole control of the adverse party, and is denied 
an adequate opportunity to conduct the desired discovery." Western 
Dairymen, 2002 UT 39 at ffif 27,48 P.3d 910; see also Crossland Sav., 877 
P.2d at 1243-44 (addressing the timeliness of a rule 56(f) motion); Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311,312-315 (Utah 1984) (same); Strand v. Associated 
Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193-94 (Utah 1977) (same). 
(Energy Management Services, L.L.C v. Shaw, 110 P.3d 158 (Utah 
App.,2005)1fl2) 
Davidhizar did not diligently seek access to information that was within the sole 
control of Fisher, and was not denied an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. 
Davidhizer failed to identify any information that was in Fisher's exclusive knowledge or 
control or in the knowledge or control of any other person that would defeat the motions 
for summary judgment, nor did he identify any steps he took to obtain the desired 
information. (R. at 454-457) Fisher answered all of Davidhizar's requests for discovery, 
he supplied thousands of pages of documents in his possession to Davidhizar, and he gave 
nine hours of deposition testimony. (R. at 561, at ffif 12,17,24,25.) In addition, 
Davidhizar had access to all the depositions, fact witnesses' depositions and to all 
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witnesses. (R. at 561, at f 23,24). Yet, Mr. Wuthrich failed to identify any information 
that he claimed was within Fisher's exclusive knowledge or control that would aid 
Davidhizar's opposition to Fisher's motion for summary judgment. 
In addition, Davidhizar had had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. He 
had had more than two years and eight months to conduct discovery. He had requested 
and received answers to interrogatories and requests for admissions, he had taken 
depositions, and had spoken with witnesses. He had taken Fisher's deposition for 
approximately nine hours. In addition, Fisher also agreed to a fifth amended scheduling 
order to give Davidhizar time in which to complete discovery. (R. at 562, [^26) 
The facts are that Davidhizar possessed sufficient information to file an opposing 
affidavit on the issues presented in the summary judgment. Davidhizar had available to 
him all of the documents in Fisher's possession, the deposition transcripts of the 
defendants, deposition transcripts of witnesses, approximately three hundred pages of 
Fisher's deposition transcript, and Fisher's responses to Defendants' discovery requests 
which included thousands of pages of documents. (R. at 572, % 13) And, in Fisher's 
deposition, Davidhizar asked questions concerning all the issues presented in the motions 
for summary judgment. (R. at 578, ^ f 5) 
Third, Mr. Wuthrich claims that he had sent his notice of withdrawal prior to 
receiving the motion for summary judgment. Although being sent before Mr. Wuthrich 
received Fisher's motion for summary judgment, the notice was mailed one day after, and 
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filed six days after the motion was filed. (R. at 550). Two weeks later Mr. Wuthrich filed 
his motion to withdraw and motion for extension of time to respond to Fisher's motion for 
summary judgment (R. at 557,554). Regardless, until the trial court issued an order 
allowing him to withdraw, Mr. Wuthrich was still Davidhizar's attorney with an ethical 
obligation to protect Davidhizar's interests. 
Fourth, Mr. Wuthrich failed to demonstrate that there was a conflict of interest 
between co-defendants justifying the granting of the motion to extend time to file a 
memorandum. (R. at 557 % 5, 8) The motion for summary judgment concerned only 
Davidhizar and not any of Mr. Wuthrich's other clients so there was no conflict of 
interest for Mr. Wuthrich to represent Davidhizar in the summary judgment motion. 
Simultaneous representation of co-defendants is governed by Rule 1.7.(b) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. 
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may 
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely 
affected; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple 
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include 
explanation to each client of the implications of the common representation 
and the advantages and risks involved. 
"An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the 
parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact 
that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabiUties in 
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question." (Rules Of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment "Conflicts in Litigation"). 
Mr. Wuthrich failed to state the nature of the conflict and therefore, it was impossible for 
the trial court to have determined if there was justification for granting the motion to 
extend time. (R. at 556-557). 
In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Fisher's motion to strike 
Davidhizar's memorandum in opposition that was filed nearly seven months after Fisher 
filed his motion for summary judgment. A seven month delay is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the time limitation of Rule 7(c)(1) to prevent undue delay in a lawsuit. The 10 
day time limitation for a party to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment ensures that the lawsuit will either continue forward or judgment will 
be entered against the non-moving party. 
Having a time limitation is also consistent with the ethical obligation of an attorney 
to take the necessary steps to protect a clients's interests. (Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules 
of Professional Practice) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.") (See also Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, 
Comment [1]) (" A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, 
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer and take whatever lawful and ethical 
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client's behalf") 
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Also, Davidhizar was represented by Mr. Wuthrich for five of the seven months 
between the date Fisher filed his motion for summary judgment and the date Davidhizar 
filed his memorandum in opposition. And Davidhizar was also represented by Mr. 
Lyman Belnap for all of those seven months, and yet neither of the attorneys filed a 
memorandum or took any action to protect Davidhizar's interests. (R. at 93) Mr. Belnap 
did not join in Mr. Wuthrich's motion to extend the time to file an opposing memorandum 
and did not personally file a motion to extend the time to file an opposing memorandum. 
Mr. Belnap and Mr. Wuthrich resided in Idaho but did not practice in the same office. 
Davidhizar argues that he was diligent in filing his memorandum because " . . . the 
summary judgment motion corresponded with a period of transition during which Dr. 
Davidhizar was trying to obtain new counsel." [Appellant's Reply Brief, at p. 24] He 
attempts to justify his failure to file a memorandum for nearly seven months after he was 
served with the motion and memorandum by stating that he filed the memorandum within 
24 days after the trial court entered its order allowing Mr. Wuthrich to withdraw as 
counsel and within 15 days after Mr. Olsen filed his appearance on November 10,2005. 
However, as demonstrated above, there was no period of transition. Mr. 
Wuthrich's motion to withdraw as counsel was not granted for approximately five months 
after Fisher's motion was filed, and Mr. Wuthrich was still representing Davidhizar 
during those five months, and Davidhizar was also represented by Mr. Belnap during the 
alleged "transition period". Both Mr. Wuthrich and Mr. Belnap had an ethical obligation 
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to take the necessary steps to protect Davidhizar's interests with reasonable diligence and 
promptness. (Rule 1.3, Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice; Rule 1.3, Supreme 
Court Rules of Professional Practice, Comment [1]) 
In summary, the trial court's denial of Fisher's summary judgment motion was an 
abuse of discretion because: 1) Rule 7(c)(1) mandates Davidhizar to file a memorandum 
within 10 days after he received Fisher's motion for summary judgment which he did not 
do (Rule 7(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure); 2) Davidhizar failed to timely file 
a motion to extend the time to file a memorandum; 3) Davidhizar failed to justify his 
failure to timely file his motion to extend; 4) Davidhizar was represented by Mr. Wuthrich 
for more than 5 months "during the period of transition and no action was taken to oppose 
the summary judgment motion (R. at 600-601); 5) Davidhizar was also represented by Mr. 
Belnap during the entire "period of transition" and he never filed a memorandum; (R. at 
93); 6) Davidhizar did not obtain Mr. Olsen as additional counsel for more than 3 months 
after the trial court entered an order allowing Mr. Wuthrich to withdraw and nearly 2 
months after Fisher served a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel (R. 554, 600-603, 
605,612); and 7) Davidhizar did not file a memorandum until 15 days after his new 
counsel filed an appearance. 
For the trial court to deny the motion to strike Davidhizar's memorandum in 
opposition to Fisher's motion for summary judgment was against the logic of the 
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice . To 
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allow the filing of a memorandum in opposition to a summary judgment motion seven 
months after the motion was filed, without any justification for failing to obey the time 
limitations for filing set by the Utah Rules of Civil procedure, having failed to file a 
memorandum for seven months even though represented by counsel is arbitrary and 
unreasonable and shocks one's sense of justice. 
II. The Trial Court Committed Error in Denying Fisher's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Davidhizar's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
Davidhizar argues that the trial court eired by weighing the disputed evidence in 
deciding whether that evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates the occurrence of 
fraud. He also argues that Fisher is asking this Court to do the same. Davidhizar 
disregards the legal principle that the elements of fraud must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. (See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991)). 
Instead, he wants this Court to consider only his evidence which he contends satisfies the 
clear and convincing standard of proof. 
To satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof, evidence must have the 
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the facts it purports 
to prove, and has an element of clinching such truth or correctness. For a matter to be 
clear and convincing to a particular mind it must at least have reached the point where 
there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. (See 
Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454 (Utah,1955)). 
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Fisher argued in his motion for summary judgment that Davidhizar could not prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) Fisher made a representation concerning a 
presently existing material fact which was false; and 2) he justifiably relied on Fisher's 
expression of value. In his memorandum opposing the summary judgment, Davidhizar 
failed to demonstrate that the evidence raises to the quantum and quality of proof which 
leaves no serious or substantial doubt that: 1) Fisher made a representation concerning a 
presently existing material fact which was false; and 2) he relied on Fisher's 
representation. 
A. The Expression of Value is an Opinion andNot Fact. 
Davidhizar argues that because Fisher's attorney calculated his opinion of value on 
accounting records that his expression of value somehow becomes fact and not opinion. 
Davidhizar does not cite any authority that supports that argument. And the only evidence 
that he presents to show that Fisher's expression of value is fact, is that Fisher used the 
actual incomes and the actual amounts billed on the doctor's contracts. 
Davidhizar contends that since Fisher used the actual incomes and actual amounts 
billed, his expression of value is fact because his expression does not involve a "matter of 
judgment or estimation as to which men may differ." [Appellant's Reply Brief at p. 4). 
Fisher used the actual amount collected and the actual amount billed for the 
doctors to help form his opinion of value. Though the amount collected and the amount 
billed are fact, they do not represent the value of the doctor's contracts. Fisher used those 
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numbers as a starting point, then he determined a monthly and yearly income for the 
doctors' contracts. He then used one year of estimated incomes and a portion of the 
estimated amount of billings to determine a value. 
Since the doctors' contracts had been in existence for just a few months, men will 
differ as to whether Fisher's estimation of monthly and yearly income is accurate or 
appropriate, whether the value should be based on an estimated yearly income and 
whether the doctors' contracts would continue earning income at the same amount each 
month, and whether his judgment to base value on the estimated yearly income was 
correct, etc. 
In addition, Fisher's attorney told Davidhizar, and Davidhizar does not dispute 
that the expression of value was Fisher's attorney's opinion based on Fisher's judgment 
and estimations. (R. at 322-324, ffllO to 22; R. at 615). 
Fisher told Davidhizar: 1) in a letter that "[t]he client contracts have value and 
though we can disagree as to the amount of value, there is no question that they have 
value (R. 322 at ^ flO); 2) that the client contracts did not have a stated value and 
therefore, it was difficult to value the client contracts, nevertheless, he believed that 
businesses were sometimes valued by multiplying their gross income for one year by a 
factor of one to seven and that it was his opinion that a business such as OMC which had 
been operating for approximately two years should be valued at one to two times its gross 
income from the DRS tables for the period of time it had been in existence and that he had 
13 
chosen to multiply OMC's projected yearly income and projected yearly billing by one to 
reach a value for OMC's contracts (R. 322 at p.4,1J12); (3 that it was his opinion that 
OMC's client contracts should be valued at $60,000 to $80,000 and explained that the 
$60,000 represented the projected income for one year on the client contracts based on the 
actual income collected by OMC on each of the client contracts and the $80,000 
represented the projected amount to be billed for one year on the client contracts based on 
the actual amount billed by OMC on the client contracts (R. 322 at p.4, [^13); 4) that he 
arrived at that valuation by learning the amount of income collected and the amount billed 
by Drs. Cutler, Jeppsen, and Ott for the DRS tables from OMC's Transaction Journal 
Detail report (R. 3231 at p.5, ^fl4); 5) that he multiplied the average monthly amount of 
income collected and the average monthly amount billed by each doctor by twelve to 
obtain the amount that each client would produce in gross income and the amount each 
client would bill in one year (R. 323 at p.5, ^ 15); 6) that since he did not know a better 
way to value the client contracts and because the actual amount collected would be more 
than $70,000 a year and the actual amount billed would be more than $200,000 a year, he 
arbitrarily choose the amount of $60,000 to $80,000 in an attempt to be reasonable and 
fair (R. 323 at p.5,1J15); and 7) that he estimated the amount being paid to Coder by 
Boyer to be the sum of $2,000-3,000 per month which was confirmed by Coder, who also 
confirmed that the money belonged to OMC (R. 323 at p.5, If 15,16,17,18; R. 324 at p. 6, 
119). 
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Lastly, to show that Fisher's expression of value is fact and not opinion, 
Davidhizar must demonstrate that Fisher's expression of value is not his true opinion. 
(Wrightv. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 513 (Utah App.,1990)) ("Ifthe stated value is 
truly the owner's opinion then the buyer may not base his or her fraud claim on that 
opinion, regardless of the accuracy of the opinion."). 
Davidhizar has failed to present any evidence that the representation of value by 
Attorney Fisher was not his true opinion. The only evidence before the trial court was that 
the representation was the true opinion of Attorney Fisher. And, it does not matter 
whether Attorney Fisher's calculation of value is accurate. (Wright, at 513) 
The evidence with all reasonable inferences drawn in Davidhizar's favor, is not 
sufficient to prove that Fisher's expression of value is fact and not opinion. After 
becoming acquainted with the evidence, there still remains serious and substantial doubt 
as to whether Fisher's expression of value is a representation concerning a presently 
existing material fact which was false. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that 
Davidhizar did not proffer clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Fisher's 
expression of value was fact and not opinion. 
B. Davidhizar Has Not Presented Clear and Convincing Evidence That 
Fisher's Representation That the Contracts Were in Good Condition and 
Good Standing was False. 
Davidhizar argues that he has presented clear and convincing evidence that Dr. 
Cutler intended to or did change/terminate his client contract prior to the February 18, 
15 
2002 meeting. To show he has presented clear and convincing evidence Davidhizar: 1) 
cites alleged statements made by Dr. Cutler to himself and to Dennis McOmber; 2) he 
cites testimony given by Coder, and 3) refers to the fact that Dr. Cutler did terminate his 
contract after he had spoken with him. 
Davidhizar further argues that his, McOmber's, and Coder's testimony is clear and 
convincing evidence that Dr. Cutler's contract was not in good standing. He also argues 
that only the testimony he presented can be considered by this Court and that this Court 
cannot weigh that evidence. 
A grant of summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56 (C). On appeal, this Court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. {Doctors9 Co. v. Drezga, 218 P.3d 598 (Utah, 2009) at 
Tf 9). This means that this Court evaluates all the evidence presented to determine if there 
is a dispute of facts and not just the evidence presented by Davidhizar. Once this Court 
has determined that there is a dispute of facts, it does not go on and weigh those disputed 
facts to decide the issue. {Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 765 
(Utah, 1988)). 
Davidhizar also wants this Court to ignore that he has the burden to demonstrate 
that the evidence satisfies the clear and convincing standard of proof. The standard of 
proof dictates the quantum and quality of evidence required to prevail (Hansen v. 
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Hansen, 958 P.2d 931,934 (Utah App.,1998)). The function of a standard of proof is to 
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks he should have 
in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. The standard 
allocates the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision. {Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058 
(Utah,2007)atfl2). 
To satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof, evidence must have the 
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact it purports to 
prove, and has an element of clinching such truth or correctness. For a matter to be clear 
and convincing to a particular mind it must at least have reached the point where there 
remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. (See 
Jardine 279 P.2d 454,457 (Utah,1955)). 
Contrary to Davidhizar's assertions, the evidence with all reasonable inferences 
drawn in Davidhizar's favor, is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact or 
to prove that Fisher misrepresented the status of the doctors' contracts by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Davidhizar attempts to create a dispute of fact by claiming that: 1) he and 
McOmber were told by Dr. Cutler that he had already told Fisher his intention to change 
or cancel the contract; 2) that Coder was told by Fisher that Dr. Cutler had "already 
elected to opt out of his contract" and "was negotiating to make it a lease agreement"; and 
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3) that comments were made in a meeting with Fisher, Attorney Fisher, and Cheryl Fisher 
that Dr. Cutler was not happy and he wanted out of his contract and that Fisher was 
negotiating the lease agreement. [Appellant's Reply Brief at pp. 6-7]. 
These facts are insufficient to satisfy Davidhizar's burden of proof because these 
facts are contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Cutler and David Fisher and because the 
testimony of Davidhizar, Coder and McOmber is inconsistent. 
Dr. Cutler testified that;l) he did not tell Davidhizar on February 19,2002 that he 
had terminated his contract with OMC (R. 838 at p. 36, line 15 to R. 839 p. 37, line 7); 
and 2) his decision to terminate his contract with OMC was made during or after his 
conversation with Davidhizar on February 19,2002 (R. 840 at p. 52, line 17 to R. 841 p. 
53, line 5). Fisher also testified that Dr. Cutler had never informed him prior to February 
18,2002 that he wanted to or intended to cancel or terminate his contract with OMC. (R. 
at 3724 41) 
Coder testified: 1) that he was told by Attorney Fisher that since Coder was not 
working for OMC and Fisher was not licensed to perform medical billing for doctors, the 
doctors' contracts would have to be changed to leases and that Fisher had spoken to some 
of the doctors to determine if a change in their contracts would be acceptable to them (R. 
848 at p. 241 ,line 20 to R. 849 p. 242, line 8); 2) that he was told by Fisher that Dr. 
Cutler's contract was going to be changed to a lease agreement or that he is negotiating to 
make it a lease agreement (R. at 846, p. 206, lines 18-25) 3) that he was told that the lease 
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would require Dr. Cutler to pay the amount of the payment Fisher was making on the 
table plus ten percent (R. at 844, p. 116, line 16 to p. 117, line 16); 4) that he told 
Davidhizar about the terms of the lease agreement (id.); and 5) that Davidhizar stated that 
if the doctors accepted the terms of the lease that he would accept the lease agreement. 
(Id.) 
Davidhizar testified in deposition that Dr. Cutler told him that he negotiated a new 
contract with Fisher and agreed to pay the loan payment plus 10%, not that Dr. Cutler 
intended to change his contract. (R. at 653, p. 93, lines 6-12). Davidhizar also testified in 
deposition that Dr. Cutler told him that he had terminated his contract not that he intended 
to terminate the contract. (R. at 631, p. 54, lines 13-25) 
The contradictions in testimony demonstrate that Davidhizar's evidence does not 
have the quantum or quality needed to satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof 
and creates serious or substantial doubt that Dr. Cutler terminated or intended to terminate 
his contract prior to the meeting on February 18,2002. 
In addition, the fact that Dr. Cutler did not terminate his contract until five days 
after he met with Davidhizar is further proof that Davidhizar's, McOmber's and Coder's 
testimony cannot be believed and lacks the quantum and quality necessary to meet the 
clear and convincing standard of proof and adds to the serious or substantial doubt that 
Dr. Cutler terminated or intended to terminate his contract prior to the meeting on 
February 18,2002 or that he told Davidhizar, McOmber, or Coder that he had. 
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Davidhizar also argues that Dr. Jeppsen's table had not been in operation for 4-6 
weeks and there had been problems with the billing company in collecting income. 
Davidhizar knew the problems with Dr. Jeppsen's table because he had the accounting 
records. 
Contrary to Davidihizar's assertion, he did not include the alleged problems with 
Dr. Jeppsen's contract in his memorandum opposing the summary judgment motion but 
referred to it in his opposition to the motion in limine filed nearly 29 months after Fisher 
filed his summary judgment motion. (R. 624-628; R. at 1186 f 13) Dr. Jeppsen's 
problems were not raised by Davidhizar in his response to the summary judgment and 
therefore, should not be considered on appeal. 
C. Davidhizar Did Not Present Clear and Convincing Evidence That He 
Justifiably Relied on Fisher's Alleged Misrepresentations. 
Davidhizar argues that reasonable reliance is usually a question for the jury to 
determine and Fisher's facts being based on hearsay, supported by confusing and 
ambiguous record references, and based on documents from the record for which no 
authentication or explanations are offered establish that the trial court correctly denied the 
motion for summary judgment. 
Davidhizar argues that Fisher failed to offer any admissible evidence 
demonstrating that the documents showing that the medical tables were losing money 
were received by Davidhizar. 
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Contrary to Davidhizar's assertion, Fisher did demonstrate that Davidhizar had 
received the accounting records that showed the tables were losing money. [Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at p. 8, [^27 to p. 10, f 41]. Fisher presented testimony from 
Nash, Coder and Davidhizar establishing that Davidhizar had the accounting records of 
OMC. 
Davidhizar also argues that the documents referred to by Fisher reference changes 
that would be made to remedy the loss of income and are inconsistent with the amoimt of 
income being generated by the OMC contracts and the status of such contracts. However, 
Davidhizar fails to cite to any documents that support his argument that the documents 
referenced changes to remedy the loss of income, and has not demonstrated how such 
language would prove that Davidhizar did reasonably rely on any of Fisher's 
representations. All of the documents referred to by Fisher show that the tables were 
losing money and that the attempts to remedy the loss of income had failed. 
Davidhizar argues that the records delivered to Nash were incomplete, etc. and that 
he didn't see them and that Fisher has failed to present admissible evidence that they were 
delivered or accurately portrayed OMC's financial status.2 
Contrary to Davidhizar's assertions, Davidhizar did have the accounting records. 
(R. at 793 to 801) 
2Davidhizar raises for the first time on appeal that the accounting records may not 
accurately portray OMC's financial status and therefore should not be considered by the Court. 
21 
Davidhizar argues that the law allows him to justifiably rely on positive assertions 
of fact without independent investigation. However, he does not state what positive 
assertions of fact he justifiably relied on. And rightfully so because there are none. 
Davidhizar also argues that Fisher's assertion that Davidhizar relied on Nash in 
determining to enter into the Agreement is flawed because: 1) the assertion contradicts 
Davidhizar's own testimony about reliance on Fisher's representations; 2) Nash's opinion 
as an accountant was only one of the factors upon which Davidhizar relied in making his 
decision; and 3) Nash heard and relied on the same misrepresentations in making his 
recommendation to Davidhizar. 
First, Davidhizar's assertion that he relied only on Fisher's representations is 
contradicted by Davidhizar's own deposition testimony that "..I know I would not have 
signed that agreement if he [Nash] hadn't said it looks reasonable." (R. at 828 at lines 14-
18). Second, Davidhizar admits in his argument that he relied on Nash's opinion to enter 
into the Agreement. Third, Nash had complete accounting records from which he advised 
Davidhizar and prepared tax returns for OMC and therefore knew the financial status of 
OMC and did not rely on Fisher's representations. 
Finally, Davidhizar argues that his knowledge that the doctors could terminate their 
contracts on thirty day written notice does not affect his reliance on Fisher's 
representations because if he had known the problems with the contracts he could have 
properly evaluated the risks. 
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Davidhizar knew that the contracts were subject to a thirty day termination notice. 
He also told Coder that if the contracts were changed to a lease providing payment of the 
loan amount plus 10% he would accept them. Therefore, he was willing to accept the 
lease that he claims Dr. Cutler had with Fisher. He also knew of the collection problems 
with Dr. Jeppsen because he had the financial records. Therefore, before signing the 
agreement, he knew the situation with Jeppsen and had considered the risk. 
It is clear in reviewing the evidence that it does not rise to quantum and quality of 
proof necessary to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof and there are serious 
doubts as to whether Davidhizar relied on the representations of Fisher. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Fisher respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
trial court's ruling denying Fisher's motion to strike Davidhizar's opposing memorandum 
and the trial court's ruling denying Fisher's motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 2010. 
DARWIN C. FISHER, P.C. 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
David Fisher 
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